Theory and Anti-Theory in the Work of Allan Farnsworth by Barnes, Wayne R.
Texas A&M University School of Law
Texas A&M Law Scholarship
Faculty Scholarship
2006
Theory and Anti-Theory in the Work of Allan
Farnsworth
Wayne R. Barnes
Texas A&M University School of Law, wbarnes@law.tamu.edu
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.tamu.edu/facscholar
Part of the Contracts Commons, and the Legal History Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Texas A&M Law Scholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship by an
authorized administrator of Texas A&M Law Scholarship. For more information, please contact aretteen@law.tamu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Wayne R. Barnes, Theory and Anti-Theory in the Work of Allan Farnsworth, 13 Tex. Wesleyan L. Rev. 1 (2006).
Available at: https://scholarship.law.tamu.edu/facscholar/290









Edited with an Introduction by
Wayne Barnes7
INTRODUCTION
When Allan Farnsworth passed away on January 31, 2005, the world
lost a titan in the field of contracts. Immediately following his death,
the tributes from fellow contracts scholars came in droves. His one-
time Dean at Columbia, Lance Liebman, stated that "Allan Farns-
worth was the great contemporary American scholar, and one of a
handful of great world scholars, of the law of agreement .... [He] was
... perhaps The Authority, on the law of contracts and much more."8
Professor Joseph Perillo stated: "Every generation seems to produce a
leader in our field of contract law. There was Samuel Williston, then
1. Professor of Law, Michael E. Moritz College of Law, The Ohio State
University.
2. Professor of Law, University of Houston Law Center. Editorial Reviser,
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS (1981).
3. Faculty of Law, Hebrew University of Jerusalem. Visiting Scholar, Center for
the Study of Law and Society, Boalt Hall School of Law, University of California,
Berkeley.
4. Carmack Waterhouse Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center.
5. Distinguished Professor of Law, Emeritus, Fordham University School of Law.
6. Professor of Law, Durham University, UK.
7. Associate Professor, Texas Wesleyan University School of Law. I thank Frank
Snyder, Professor of Law at Texas Wesleyan University School of Law, for conceiving
and organizing the International Contracts Conference, which was held at Texas
Wesleyan on February 24-25, 2006. Many thanks of course also to the eminently
distinguished panel of speakers who participated in the discussion. I also thank Frank
for the privilege of writing this introduction and helping to edit the manuscript of the
panel discussion included herein. I know I speak for Frank when I gratefully
acknowledge the moral and financial support of former Dean Fred Slabach and the
Texas Wesleyan University School of Law, who made this panel discussion possible, as
well as the entire International Contracts Conference. I also wish to thank the Editors
of the Texas Wesleyan Law Review.
8. Lance Liebman, In Memoriam, Allan Farnsworth, ALl Reporter, 105 COLUM.
L. REV. 1429, 1430-31 (2005).
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Arthur Corbin, and in our time, Allan Farnsworth."9 Professor Mark
Gergen observed, "Allan truly was the premier figure in American
Contracts law scholarship since the passing of Corbin and Dawson.
The treatise and his half of the Second Restatement would be quite a
contribution if there was nothing else."1 Farnsworth's colleague
Carol Sanger correctly observed that "Allan is one of the few among
us whose name stands for the field. When judges and lawyers start
sentences and answer questions with the phrase 'Farnsworth says...'
the matter is settled and the Contracts gods relax in their heavens.""
Indeed, it is scarcely necessary to say that, although Professor
Farnsworth is gone, he is not really gone, because his contributions to
the literature and doctrinal exposition available to all of us are im-
mense, incomparable, and invaluable. Professor Austin Scott once
said "that to be great, a law professor must accomplish a casebook, a
treatise, and a Restatement."12 According to this and any other
formula, then, Farnsworth must be considered great. His casebook,
Cases and Materials on Contracts,'3 is perennially the most widely
adopted Contracts casebook at law schools in the United States, and it
has been used by generations of law students. His treatise, Farnsworth
on Contracts," is an expository marvel of Contracts doctrine and may
well be the most-often cited authority on Contracts.1 5 He wrote doz-
ens of thoughtful law review articles. He became a leading interna-
tional voice in the drafting and promulgation of the United Nations
Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (CISG)
and its Commentary,1 6 which have been adopted by over sixty coun-
tries. 7 He was also a key figure in drafting the UNIDROIT Princi-
9. Carol Sanger, In Memoriam, Remarks for Allan Farnsworth Memorial, 105
COLUM. L. REV. 1432, 1432 (2005).
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Liebman, supra note 8, at 1430.
13. E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, WILLIAM F. YOUNG & CAROL SANGER, CASES AND
MATERIALS: CONTRACTS (6th ed. 2001).
14. E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS (4th ed. 2004) [hereinafter
"CONTRACTS"].
15. Professor Lance Liebman of Columbia Law School, who served as Columbia's
dean from 1991-1996, reported in his memorial remarks that Farnsworth was not one
who needed either help or attention from the Dean. However, Liebman observed
that "once [Farnsworth] came into my office, a mischievous twinkle in his eye, to
share the news that on that day, the recorded number of citations to Farnsworth on
Contracts had moved into first place among all legal publications, displacing Willis-
ton." Liebman, supra note 8, at 1429.
16. United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods,
U.N. Doc. A/CONF.97/18 (1980).
17. Michael Joachim Bonell, In Memoriam, Remembering Allan Farnsworth on the
International Scene, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1417, 1417-18 (2005) (citing CISG: Partici-
pating Countries, http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cisg/countries/cntries.html (last visited
Oct. 21, 2006)).
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ples of International Commercial Contracts, which has served as "a
sort of international restatement of contract law."
18
And then there is, of course, his role as the second Reporter for the
Restatement (Second) of Contracts.'9 Samuel Williston had been the
Reporter for the First Restatement,20 and Farnsworth ably succeeded
in that role. He was appointed as Reporter in 1971 when he suc-
ceeded Robert Braucher. He was only 43 years old at the time.21
Though Farnsworth ascended to the Reporter position among many of
the stalwarts, many of whom were obviously much older, in the acad-
emy and the profession at the time, he took immediate command of
the proceedings and shaped the Second Restatement according to his
vision of precision, consistency, and elegance. 22 It is now the twenty-
fifth anniversary of the Second Restatement, and it has thus far admir-
ingly endured the supervening decades of theoretical flux. Farnsworth
is reported to have said to the ALI leadership, "You can't do another
Restatement of Contracts while I'm alive," which command of course
was ultimately followed.23 It has been suggested by Jean Braucher
that "a fitting tribute to Professor Farnsworth would be to leave this
elegant version alone for a long, long time."
24
In the year or more since Farnsworth's death, scholars have had
time to begin to reflect on the final body of work that Farnsworth
amassed. Inevitably, the role of historians comes into play, and vari-
ous aspects of Farnsworth's record have begun to be reexamined in a
new light subsequent to his death. Peter Linzer is one such historian
and scholar who wondered about Farnsworth's appreciation for the
work of theoretical scholars in the latter half of the twentieth century.
Farnsworth, in one dominant sense, was clearly a successor in the line
of doctrinal expositors of Contract law of the likes of Williston and
Corbin. His rise to prominence, however, also fairly coincided with
the rise of numerous modern theoretical approaches to Contracts and
other law, such as Critical Legal Studies, law and economics, rela-
18. Id. at 1418.
19. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, at v (1981).
20. Id. at vii.
21. Jean Braucher, In Memoriam, E. Allan Farnsworth and the Restatement (Sec-
ond) of Contracts, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1420, 1421 (2005). Jean Braucher is Robert
Braucher's daughter, and in her comments she stated: "Robert Braucher shared with
Allan Farnsworth the duty of Reporter for the Restatement, and as I have told Al-
lan's daughter, Karen, I heard stories of her father around my own family's dinner
table." Id. at 1420.
22. Id. at 1421-22.
23. Id. at 1425-26. Professor Liebman recounts that when he became a director
for the ALI in 1998, Farnsworth "scheduled lunch and presented the arguments why
there was no need for a Restatement (Third) of Contracts. I hastened to respond that
no expert with whom I had spoken thought there was such a need. All agreed that
the Restatement Second, the work first of my own teacher Robert Braucher and then,
for ten years, of E. Allan Farnsworth, needed little modernization." Liebman, supra
note 8, at 1429 (footnote omitted).
24. Braucher, supra note 21, at 1426.
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tional theory, promise theory, reliance theory, and feminist theory.25
Celebrated by many as a welcome addition to the legal scholarship,
Professor Linzer suspected that perhaps Farnsworth was not as enam-
ored with theory as others. One can certainly see why Professor
Linzer believed this might be so. For one thing, quite obviously,
Farnsworth appeared to be primarily involved with descriptive works
regarding Contract law, especially his treatise and the Restatement.
There are other clues, however, that may corroborate Professor
Linzer's contention that Farnsworth may not have held the emerging
theoretical approaches to Contract law in the same esteem as some of
his colleagues in the academy. Perhaps most famously, as described
by Professor Linzer and Professor Randy Barnett in their remarks,
Farnsworth purported to reveal several fallacies with Contracts schol-
arship in a presentation he gave at an AALS Contracts Workshop in
1986, from which the presentation was made into an article in the
Journal of Legal Education.2 6 Farnsworth noted that after Grant Gil-
more proclaimed the Death of Contract in 1974, all scholars deemed
themselves free to create their own theory of Contract, unhindered by
prior classic Contract doctrine.27 Indeed, he observed that it became
quite fashionable to do so. 28 However, Farnsworth disputed the con-
ventional wisdom "that contemporary contracts theories have pro-
foundly transformed the legal profession," intoning simply that
"[t]hey have not."' 29 He then viewed the various "theories" of Con-
tract law as having further increased the gap between scholars and
practicing lawyers, and he believed that theorizing had "led to an ex-
cessive emphasis by scholars on why promises are enforced."3 ° In his
conclusion, he advised that "future scholars looking for potential top-
ics might look elsewhere." 31
None of this is to say that Farnsworth was unaware of, or even
overtly hostile to, the modern theoretical approaches to Contract law.
Indeed, Farnsworth "knew every case, every law review article, every
new trend in theoretical scholarship, and every argument that contem-
25. See, e.g., Liebman, supra note 8, at 1431 ("Legal Realism, Critical Legal Stud-
ies, Law and Economics, other 'Law and' movements" arose since Farnsworth's rise
to prominence.); Randy E. Barnett, The Richness of Contract Theory, 97 MICH. L.
REV. 1413, 1418 (1999) [hereinafter "Richness of Contract Theory"] (cataloguing "a
variety of theoretical approaches: promise theorists, reliance theorists, feminist theo-
rists, efficiency theorists, relational theorists, and critical legal scholars"); Braucher,
supra note 21, at 1424 ("The publication of the second Restatement in 1981 coincided
with the rise of Critical Legal Studies, a movement hostile to black letter formulations
of law.").
26. E. Allan Farnsworth, A Fable and a Quiz on Contracts, 37 J. LEGAL EDUC. 206
(1987) [hereinafter "Fable and Quiz"].
27. Id. at 206.
28. Id. at 208.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 209. A
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porary values require reconsideration of traditional doctrine. '3 2 And
he may well have been open to recognizing the value of certain theo-
retical approaches to Contract law. On the issue of whether contract
law is a discipline distinct and separate from economics, his answer
was "sometimes."33 Jean Braucher recounts Farnsworth's response to
a sociological theory presented by Stewart Macaulay at a Contracts
conference in Madison: "Does one have to be a total immersion Bap-
tist to please you or would you be satisfied with someone who put his
toe in the water?"34 That is to say, perhaps, that while Farnsworth
appreciated such modern theoretical approaches to Contracts, his ap-
preciation was only to a certain extent.
And there are many other clues, which Professor Linzer has done a
marvelous job of finding and discussing, and perhaps ironically, theo-
rizing about. In his talk at the International Contracts Conference held
at Texas Wesleyan University School of Law on February 24-25, 2006,
Professor Linzer shared his thoughts and theories on the subject of
Farnsworth's appreciation (or lack thereof) for theoretical approaches
to Contract law. The members of the panel responded to Professor
Linzer's thoughts with some challenges to Linzer's theory, including a
debate about the meaning of the term "theorist" and whether Farns-
worth's disposition towards theory was or was not favorable, and
whether such disposition was a function of his generation.
THE DISCUSSION
LARRY GARVIN: I am delighted to be here to moderate this as-
tonishingly-not astonishingly because Frank [Snyder] put it to-
gether-distinguished panel. What we have is a principal working
paper from Peter Linzer, who I will note does excellent work in rela-
tion to contract areas. The paper is here entitled, "E. Allan Farns-
worth's Theory (Non-Theory?, Anti-Theory?, Meta-Theory?) of
Contracts." And then we have four commentators proceeding from
Peter. We have Hila Keren from Boalt and Hebrew University. We
have Randy Barnett, for the moment from BU, but presently Ge-
orgetown. Yes. That is correct.
RANDY BARNETT: Well, I am back at BU now, but I will be
joining the Georgetown faculty next year. That's the whole story.
You don't want to know any more.
GARVIN: A very fine story. With the wonderful contract
casebook35 and even more wonderful teacher's manual.
PETER LINZER: Had to remind him.
32. Liebman, supra note 8, at 1430.
33. Braucher, supra note 21, at 1426 (citing E. Allan Farnsworth, Law Is a Some-
times Autonomous Discipline, 21 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 95, 100 (1997)).
34. Id. at 1424 (citing e-mail correspondence with Stewart Macaulay, Professor of
Law, University of Wisconsin Law School (Feb. 21-25, 2005)).
35. RANDY E. BARNETT, CONTRACTS: CASES AND DOCTRINE (3d ed. 2003).
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GARVIN: And Joseph Perillo, who needs no introduction-no one
here needs an introduction, but I insist on giving them anyway-with
a wonderful treatise 36 and casebook 37 and a scholar. And then we
have David Campbell from Durham, whose work in remedies and re-
lational contracts should be familiar to all of us. If it's not, go to your
library immediately. With that, Peter will speak for what, 20, 25 min-
utes or so?
LINZER: Or less.
GARVIN: Some comments from the commentators, then perhaps
a little discussion and opening everything up for comments as well.
Peter?
LINZER: I call this paper "E. Allan Farnsworth's Theory (Non-
Theory?, Anti-Theory?, Meta-Theory?) of Contracts" because it is
awfully hard to figure out what Allan's attitude was toward contract
theory.
I very first met Allan Farnsworth when he was 33 and I was a sec-
ond year law student at Columbia. He was a tall, incredibly smart
young man with movie star good looks-and a casebook already pub-
lished for a year or two. I later heard that in an earlier class an "older
woman," I assume she was about 30-was heard to say in a stage
whisper, "No man should be that handsome."
From the late 1970s until his death in 2005, Allan was a leading
American figure on contracts law. (I say that with no aspersions to
anybody here. He was primus inter pares. He had many, many col-
leagues of the same quality, but he led us all.) He was a careful
scholar with a wide range of non-legal interests that lent his work the
off-hand sophistication that is so typically Allan Farnsworth. For in-
stance, in the first six pages of Chapter 1 of his last book, the Alleviat-
ing Mistakes book, 38 he mentioned the Marriage of Figaro, Romeo
and Juliet, Macbeth, The Pirates of Penzance, Oedipus the King, and
legends of Aesop and of Dom Perignon's invention of champagne.
He also cited destiny-changing mistakes involving Columbus, Stone-
wall Jackson, and the chauffeur of Archduke Francis Ferdinand. That
was in six pages.39
In his Introduction, Larry Garvin, whom Allan chose to carry on
Farnsworth On Contracts, told us of Allan's immense contributions
and his immense influence on the entire subject of the law of con-
tracts. Because of the intrinsic value of Allan Farnsworth's work and
because of my personal involvement with him over the years, I have
always used it and have become more and more respectful of it.
36. JOSEPH M. PERILLO, CALAMARI AND PERILLO ON CONTRACTS (5th ed. 2003).
37. JOHN D. CALAMARI, JOSEPH M. PERILLO & HELEN HADJIYANNAKIS BENDER,
CASES AND PROBLEMS ON CONTRACTS (4th ed. 2004).
38. E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, ALLEVIATING MISTAKES: REVERSAL AND FORGIVE-
NESS FOR FLAWED PERCEPTIONS (2004) [hereinafter "ALLEVIATING MISTAKES"].
39. See id. at 1-6.
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Nonetheless, I often came away dissatisfied because Allan always
seemed to ignore questions of contract theory. You may be familiar
with how he included in his casebook and the treatise little snippets of
biographical information about people, like Lord Coke, Benjamin
Cardozo and moderns like Judith Kaye, the long-serving Chief Judge
of the New York Court of Appeals. He spoke in one of them about
Louis Brandeis's futile attempt to interest Oliver Wendell Holmes in
economics. Using the same description that Brandeis apparently gave
of Holmes's attitude toward economics, I think it could be said that
Allan had a "fastidious disrelish" for contract theory and legal theory
generally.
Randy Barnett commented on this in his book review of the first
edition of the treatise: "As good as it is, though, the book is not with-
out its weaknesses .... [Where] doctrines reflect unresolved tensions
and conflicts among underlying theories of contractual obligation and
liability, the book does little to resolve the disputes."4 °
About the same time, Allan gave a tongue-in-cheek luncheon talk
at an AALS Contracts Conference that was later published in the
Journal of Legal Education as A Fable and a Quiz on Contracts.41 I
would like to read to you excerpts from his fable:
Once upon a time a law professor named Christopher, while com-
piling a casebook on contracts, "somehow stumbled across" the
"idea that there was such a thing as a general . . . theory of con-
tract." That he did so was particularly surprising since Christopher
"seems to have been an essentially stupid man who, early in his life,
hit on one great idea to which, thereafter, he clung with all of the
tenacity of genius."
After Christopher came his disciple Samuel....
Christopher and Samuel's theory of contract was what we now
call "classical." It consisted of "pure" contract doctrine that was an
"abstraction" "blind to details of subject matter and person." ...
Finally, after criticisms by Arthur, attacks by legal realists, and
the infusion of some novel ideas by Lon and his student William,
contract-at least "classical" contract-just rolled over and died.
For the most part it was "reabsorbed into the mainstream of 'tort'";
only its ashes were left. The Death of Contract was celebrated in
1974, and all Right-Thinking People participated in the celebration.
(Students were not allowed to participate and still had to take ex-
aminations in courses with that name.)
But then a miracle occurred. Contract rose from its ashes like a
phoenix. The difference, however, was that now each and every le-
gal scholar could create his or her own new theory of contract, freed
40. Randy E. Barnett, Contract Scholarship and the Reemergence of Legal Philos-
ophy, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1223, 1238 (1984) [hereinafter "Contract Scholarship"] (re-
viewing E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS (1982)). Randy then gave his own
"consent" theory for the rest of the book review, see id. at 1239-45.
41. Fable and Quiz, supra note 26, at 206-09.
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forever from the teachings of Christopher and Samuel. Most legal
scholars did so, and these many new theories of contract profoundly
transformed the legal profession.42
That's the fable. Allan then gave the luncheon audience of contracts
professors a quiz in which he listed about 20 names to be connected
with 15 quotations supporting what he said were the four major falla-
cies in his fable: that skepticism about the division between tort and
contract was something new; that scholars of the "classical" school
stubbornly refused to recognize reliance; that Langdell and Williston
each believed he had a "theory" of contract law; and that contempo-
rary contract theories have profoundly transformed the legal profes-
sion.43 (At this point, Allan added, as an aside, that having a theory
did not become fashionable among contract scholars until 1974.)
Moreover, Allan specifically denied that the contemporary contracts
theories had profoundly transformed the legal profession, concluding
"They have not." 44
The quotations, of course, were precisely from the wrong people:
Williston talking about the connection of contract with tort and the
importance of reliance, Corbin speaking of the centrality of considera-
tion, and a scholar of the 1890s saying no writer in our jurisprudence is
authorized to speak oracularly. Allan went on to say that "[t]he urge
to have a 'theory' has tended to increase the distance between con-
tract scholarship and practice. In particular, it has led to an excessive
emphasis by scholars on why promises are enforced. ' 45 To this last
point, he appended two quotations talking about the centrality of en-
forceability of promises, and these turned out to be from Mel Eisen-
berg and Randy Barnett.46 Allan concluded, "My point is not that
these fine articles should not have been written but . . . that in the
future scholars looking for potential topics might look elsewhere. 4 7
That was his exactly typical, Farnsworthian prose, that understate-
ment with the tongue sticking through the cheek so far that no one
could miss the point. Allan was hardly alone in this attitude. He had
been taught by the stalwarts of legal realism like Karl Llewellyn, and
was typical of both much of his own generation and of the immedi-
ately preceding one in distrusting what was disparagingly called the
42. Id. at 206 (footnote omitted).
43. Id. at 207-08.
44. Id. at 208.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 208-09 (quoting Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Principles of Considera-
tion, 67 CORNELL L. REV. 640, 640 (1982)) ("The first great question on contract law
... is what kinds of promises should be enforced."); Randy E. Barnett, A Consent
Theory of Contract, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 269, 269 (1986) [hereinafter "Consent The-
ory"]. ("Contract theory at present . . . does not provide a satisfactory answer to [the]
question ... which interpersonal commitments the law ought to enforce.").
47. Fable and Quiz, supra note 26, at 209. 8
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"when I was in law school conceptualization."48 That was an attack
on the conservative swing in contract jurisprudence-meaning, among
other things, the architectural theories of classical contract and tort
law. It's hard to find much theory, formal or informal, in Prosser on
Torts49 even though Prosser had been the reporter of the Second Re-
statement of Torts5" and was one of the most influential figures in post
World War II tort law. Indeed, Prosser wrote a famous article
called-I believe the title was The Borderland of Tort and Contract,5"
and the astonishing thing about that article is he never discusses how
contracts differ from torts. That is, why they differ from torts. He
talks about statutes of limitations; he talks about causation problems.
He talks about all kinds of things like that, but he never talks about
what is the difference between a contract and a tort? And why is
there a difference?
I thought that was astonishing when I first read it, but it's really
fairly common of that era. These, of course, are people that are older
than Allan. Even Corbin, whose revolutionary contract philosophy
can be easily discerned from his treatise and from many of his articles,
never felt obliged to set it out systematically. In fact, from what I can
see, Corbin stated his theory most explicitly, I think, in his very late
articles, especially the last article he ever wrote, Sixty-Eight Years of
Law,5" and even there he spent less than ten pages on his theory. And
in the original preface to Volume 1 of the treatise, Corbin said that his
general theories will generally appear throughout the critical discus-
sion of cases and doctrine found in this treatise, but that a short state-
ment of the most fundamental of these theories and of the type of
analysis may be of service. He then made the statement in two-and-a-
half pages.53
Yet the generation that followed Allan, and in my case, the half
generation, is strongly drawn to theory. I tell my students the issue is
simply "why." Why do we have the rules we have? Why do we have
contracts? Why do we have expectation damages, and why do we pre-
fer them to specific relief? Of course, people have been asking these
questions forever, and I am certainly not denying Lon Fuller's role,54
Morris Cohen's role,55 and somebody who is not as well known as
48. For a modern example of the use of the term, see Ralph James Mooney, The
New Conceptualism in Contract Law, 74 OR. L. REV. 1131 (1995).
49. PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS (W. Page Keeton et al., eds.,
5th ed. 1984).
50. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS (1965).
51. William Lloyd Prosser, Selected Topics on the Law of Torts, in THE THOMAS
M. COOLEY LECTURES 380 (4th series 1953).
52. Arthur L. Corbin, Sixty-Eight Years at Law, 13 KAN. L. REV. 183 (1964).
53. See JOSEPH M. PERILLO, 1 CORBIN ON CONTRACTS, at vii-x (rev. ed. 1993).
54. See Lon L. Fuller, Consideration and Form, 41 COLUM. L. REV. 799 (1941);
L.L. Fuller & William R. Perdue, Jr., The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages (pts.
1 & 2), 46 YALE L.J. 52 (1936), 46 YALE L.J. 373 (1937).
55. See Morris R. Cohen, The Basis of Contract, 46 HARV. L. REV. 553 (1933).
2006]
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them, Nathan Isaacs, in his very important but largely forgotten arti-
cle, The Standardizing of Contracts in the Yale Law Journal in 1917.56
(Predictably, I learned about this article from Allan.)
But with few exceptions, the generation before the Baby Boomers
rarely asked those questions explicitly. So it seemed interesting to me
to go through some of Allan's writings, particularly his last books and
articles-and by that I mean Changing your Mind5 7 and Alleviating
Mistakes58 in particular-and the treatise to see what he had to say, to
see if he had a theory and what it was, and why he seemed so hostile
to theorizing. When I learned that Allan had written a book called
Changing Your Mind, I thought it would be his summa. I was really
excited because I thought, this is it. After all, it seems to me that the
whole point of contract is that you can't change your mind, that that is
the essence of a contract. Restatement (Second) of Contracts section 1
defines a contract as "a promise or a set of promises for the breach of
which the law gives a remedy."59 And in the comment to that section,
it said, "A promise which is a contract is said to be 'binding.' "60 It
seemed to me that in writing a book on changing your mind, Allan
would really finally be going to the essential question. When I looked
at the book, however, it seemed to me that Allan was just cataloguing
the legal rules governing a bunch of different fact situations illustrated
from familiar cases and obscure, but intriguing incidents from the
Times.
As I prepared for this talk, however, and read Changing Your Mind
more closely, I saw Allan had discussed theory to some degree and
had applied it to the various situations in an attempt to make coherent
the law's reaction to regret. Nonetheless, it was only in the last three
or four chapters he seemed to be focusing on "why" as opposed to
"when" and "how" you could change your mind. He talked about the
distinction between preclusions, relinquishments, and commitment;
and he talked about why government could or could not be estopped
and how perhaps you could make a distinction between government
in business and government dealing with private lands. He gave sev-
eral examples about government not being held to an estoppel when a
criminal deal was made. He put down six principles-reliance, inten-
tion, dependence, anti-speculation, public interest, and repose-to be
applied to the three categories of preclusion, relinquishment, and
commitment. And he said that in this case, it makes more sense to use
a given principle than that case, and so forth. So to that extent he was
56. Nathan Isaacs, The Standardizing of Contracts, 27 YALE L.J. 34 (1917).
57. E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CHANGING YOUR MIND: THE LAW OF REGRETTED
DECISIONS (1998) [hereinafter "CHANGING YOUR MIND"].
58. ALLEVIATING MISTAKES, supra note 38.
59. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 1 (1981).
60. Id. cmt. g. 1
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doing some amount of saying "why," at any rate, though I still found it
not fully to my satisfaction.
Allan wrote an article in the Fordham Law Review that was dedi-
cated to our friend Joe Perillo, and the article was entitled Parables
About Promises: Religious Ethics and Contract Enforceability,61 a
promising source for discussion of contract theory, so I looked at Al-
lan's contribution in this one.6 2 The article was informative, urbane
and witty, as one would expect from Allan, and showed a remarkable
familiarity with religious scripture and theological writing, but he of-
fered little assessment of what he discussed, other than asking the
fairly obvious question:
Would we want a society in which the dictates of religion were as
specific as in the parables from Another Realm or of the virtuous
sixteenth-century English merchant? It might be noted that the in-
fluence of Christianity on contract law did not vanish entirely with
fidei laesio. It lived on in laws prohibiting gambling and usury and
the making of contracts on Sunday. Whether such laws suggest that
a religious influence is appropriate for a diverse and secular society
is at least questionable.Br
Again, a typical Allan concluding statement.
The introductory chapter of Farnsworth on Contracts64 was another
place I looked. It's a superb place for contract students to start, and it
gives them an excellent overview of history of the enforcement of
promises and the sources of contract law. Allan devotes the first
seven pages to the meaning and role of contracts, so you might say,
well, that sounds pretty theoretical. He printed it out with little
glosses in the margin like a medieval manuscript. I am not going to
read all of them because it goes on pretty long. The interesting thing
was in that seven pages he had about 17 glosses. Thus, he spent less
than half a page on each; hardly what you would call rigorous theo-
rizing. (On the other hand, it's an introduction to a book aimed at
first-year law students.) It's a good quick survey, but again, it tells us
very little of what Allan thought of contracts.
One place in his treatise where Allan did seem to take a theoretical
stand was in endorsing Fuller and Perdue's rationale for the enforce-
ment of purely executory promises. A conundrum, one would think,
for an article famously devoted to the reliance interest in contract
damages. Why should we give any damages, much less the entire ben-
61. E. Allan Farnsworth, Parables About Promises: Religious Ethics and Contract
Enforceability, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 695 (2002) [hereinafter "Parables"].
62. I never thought of Allan as particularly religious, though I had no reason to
have an opinion one way or the other. I do remember he told a group of us that he
had an honorary degree from the Catholic University of Louvain, Belgium, and he
thought that this might be a get out of jail free card to get him, as a good Unitarian,
into heaven.
63. Parables, supra note 61 at 707.
64. CONTRACTS, supra note 14, at 9-41.
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efit of the bargain to a party who has in no way shown any reliance on
the promise now repudiated? Fuller and Perdue wrote that expecta-
tion damages were justified as a surrogate for reliance, because reli-
ance is often hard to prove or quantify, especially if it consists of
forbearance-a failure to act because the actor expected to get the
benefit of the bargain that was not performed. Allan endorsed this in
the treatise and repeated the endorsement in Changing Your Mind,
where he devoted an entire chapter to it, under the title, "A Surrogate
for an Enigma," and wrote, "[f]or me, the most satisfying answer is
still the one proposed by Lon Fuller more than 50 years ago: 'to en-
courage reliance we must ... dispense with its proof.'" 6 5 This tribute
to Fuller appeared several times in Allan's writing, but that was about
as close as I saw him getting to taking much of a stand on these kind
of basic sort of things.
Another section of the treatise does a fine job of describing the his-
tory of contracts built on Allan's superb 1969 article, The Past of
Promise.6 6 In typical Farnsworth fashion, this article began by him
quoting the Lord of the Flies67 and then going through anthropology,
history, economics, and Montesquieu's troglodytes to show how
promises and then executory promises came to be deemed legally en-
forceable. Again, however, he does not seem to be interested in ask-
ing why this happened as opposed to how.
But I did find much more of Allan and contract theories in Alleviat-
ing Mistakes and the Qops article. I found that he talked there about
the gaps between perception and reality, about Ptolemy's theory that
the sun revolved around the earth.68 He talked about the difference
between conscious ignorance and mistakes and the difference be-
tween conscious and willful ignorance. He then also discussed risk of
loss, and based on these concepts proposed a change from our present
rule that conscious ignorance does not equal mistake. In place of this,
he said, we should simply ask who should bear the risk of loss when
there is conscious ignorance. I thought that was a useful thing, and
one truly based on a theory of why we do what we do, and what we
should do once we know that.
65. See FARNSWORTH, CHANGING YOUR MIND, supra note 57.
66. E. Allan Farnsworth, The Past of Promise: An Historical Introduction to Con-
tract, 69 COLUM. L. REV. 576 (1969).
67. Id. at 576 (citing WILLIAM GOLDING, LORD OF THE FLIES (1954)).
68. See FARNSWORTH, CHANGING YOUR MIND, supra note 57. An interesting
point to me, at least, is that this was one of the rare times when I thought that Allan
hadn't shown typical Allan thoroughness. He said Ptolemy was mistaken, but many
scientists and philosophers argue that point. Thomas Kuhn has a whole discussion in
his famous and profoundly important book, Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scien-
tific Revolutions (3d ed. 1996), about the notion that Newton wasn't wrong until Ein-
stein came along and changed things, and that the concept of phlogiston wasn't wrong
until Priestly discovered oxygen and so forth. And I am kind of surprised that Allan
wasn't aware of that and didn't at least discuss that point, given all of the other things
that he knew so well. But he didn't. 1)
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He talked about the risk of loss, of course, a lot, in both mistake and
impossibility, impracticability. And here I saw him actually doing
something a little more along the line of making suggestions that were
fairly basic. He spoke about the difference between mistakes and mis-
predictions, rationality, and determinism. He spoke very much about
the difference between forgiveness and reversal. We forgive the doc-
tor who kills you by giving you mislabeled wrong medicine; at least we
don't charge him with manslaughter or murder. But when we can
change a result, we do it by reversal, such as in Sherwood v. Walker,
where a contract for sale is set aside because the cow was not barren.
This seems like more than mere categorization; his approach seemed
to go to our motivation with respect to mistakes, and from that to how
we should deal with them. To me, it was a welcome change.
There is, of course, much more, and there are people in the audi-
ence and on this panel who will and do disagree with me.69 I think it
should be obvious to you that I admired Allan immensely. I wouldn't
have written this. He was not oblivious to theory. He knew what it
was and that it was important. Yet when I got done, I had the feeling
that Allan projected a middle-of-the-road, mildly liberal Corbin point
of view without a lot of striking new ideas as far as contract theory is
concerned.
I wondered why that should be. I already suggested that some of
the answer is generational in my mind, although Ian Macneil was al-
most exactly Allan's age when he was writing his first stuff on rela-
tional contract theory.7 ° If you have ever read his hundred page
article, The Many Futures of Contract,71 you will remember that Mac-
neil spent some time on what went on in the world, including such
arcane matters as cooperation among bees and other things that didn't
really have a lot to do with contract law, but then put forth what I
think is one of the most profound theories, certainly one that has in-
fluenced me immensely-that modern contracts are much more com-
monly based on relationships between or among the parties than they
are on previously struck bargains. (I must say that Allan at one point
told me, "I do not share your fascination with relational contract
theory.")
Another factor is what might be called the Columbia effect. In the
1920s, Columbia Law School was the center of legal realism. Karl
Llewellyn was there, Robert Hale was there, William 0. Douglas was
there, Herman Oliphant was there, as well as many others who were
or became stars. It was a very important place. But from what I can
69. Keith A. Rowley, To Err is Human, 104 MICH. L. REV. 1407 (2006) (examin-
ing ALLEVIATING MISTAKES, supra note 38 as part of a survey of books related to the
law).
70. See THE RELATIONAL THEORY OF CONTRACT: SELECTED WORKS OF IAN
MACNEIL (David Campbell ed., 2001).
71. Ian R. Macneil, The Many Futures of Contracts, 47 S. CAL. L. REV. 691 (1974).
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gather in reading, legal realists provoked the same kind of hostility
that the Critical Legal Studies movement did in the '70s and '80s. Af-
ter Harlan Fiske Stone left as Columbia's long-time dean, the choice
of who would succeed him went against the Realists in a nasty and
bloody academic battle, and most of the Realists left.
As a result, Columbia changed its personality. And from then, for
close to 50 years, Columbia exuded a point of view of no point of
view. Instead, it was mildly liberal, mildly middle of the road, pro-
gressive, process-oriented, and filled with brilliant people who tended
their own gardens and avoided what they saw as trendy theorizing or
too elaborate an application of a particular approach, whether socio-
logical, economic or politico-philosophical. This went on until around
1980, and I think this Columbia-effect affected Allan. Allan was very
much a part of this. He was very much middle of the road. He knew
what he was doing. He understood it fully, but he wasn't really mak-
ing waves because he wasn't interested in making waves, probably be-
cause he thought that most waves were made for the sake of making
waves.
I think Allan's educational background is also relevant. His father
was a mathematics professor at Brown. He studied physics as an un-
dergraduate and took a science Master's at Yale. He was married to a
scientist. I think Allan functioned as an observer and a classifier
rather than a grand theorist. Galileo, after all, didn't invent the theory
that the earth revolved around the sun. He also didn't invent the tele-
scope. But he heard about the telescope and he made a better tele-
scope, and he looked at Jupiter and he saw four moons of Jupiter, and
he noticed that on different days, they are in different places. And he
realized that this meant that they were revolving around Jupiter, and
that that proved Copernicus's theory, and he said that, even though he
ran a serious risk in saying this. I know he waffled in the face of the
inquisition, but it was still Galileo who proved that the earth revolved
around the sun. And that's pretty impressive.
In a modern version, it was Arno Penzias and Robert Wilson who
noticed there was background noise in their satellite antenna at Bell
Labs. At first, they didn't have a clue-they cleaned it to make sure it
wasn't pigeon droppings that were causing the noise. But then they
heard about theories coming from Princeton, from Robert Dicke and
Jim Peebles about lingering temperature from the Big Bang, and they
published their observations, making a reference to the Peebles/Dicke
article, and the result was that Penzias and Wilson won the Nobel
Prize for physics. (I've never understood why the other guys didn't.)
Allan understood theory. He agreed mostly with Corbin, but I
think he would rather have been Galileo than Copernicus, though he
probably would have justified his choice on the ground of liking the
idea of Bertold Brecht writing a play about him.
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So I end with what I think about his Meta-theory. The law is based
on particular facts and generalizations derived from careful observa-
tion of many cases, not a grand theory to be annotated with cases that
support the theories. To continue my analogy to observational scien-
tists, he observed how birds flew, and how their muscles and bones
and feathers contributed to flight, and then put those parts together to
explain what was pretty obvious to him-that birds, in fact, flew.
Thank you.
(Applause)
GARVIN: Thank you. Now we will have some comments from our
distinguished panel.
HILA KEREN: So you already know that I didn't have a chance to
take a serious look at the paper. I did take a look at the one sentence
that you didn't say today, and I want to start from that. It's in the
paper. Because you didn't have enough time. But you finalized the
argument about Allan's education saying, we can see that he was at
heart a lawyer and a scientist, and not a philosopher. So this is one
sentence that Peter planned to say, but he didn't. And I don't know if
deep down Allan was a philosopher or not. I didn't have the chance,
as many of you probably had, to know him.
But I do know that sometimes you could find in Allan's writings a
call for philosophy in the sense of doubting and questioning, and these
sound more like little descriptive comments or remarks, almost con-
fessions about the things that American contract scholars have ne-
glected to do, but one can read them as an invitation to engage in the
kinds of contractual philosophy that Allan did not write about. To my
mind, it is as if he did think it was an important job to be done regard-
ing contract law but he, himself, preferred to analyze documents, or-
ganize, reorganize as a doctrine, leaving the work of doubting and
questioning for others to do.
One example, which I will talk about tomorrow in another panel, is
Allan's remark that-I am quoting-"the subject of freedom of con-
tract and Constitutional law has provoked little discussion in the
United States." Another example is from a talk he gave in Italy
where he admitted to little American engagement in comparative law.
Allan said to his European listeners, "We of the common law tradition
have shown less proficiency at comparative law and have often de-
pended upon Europeans." And then he asked, "To what extent is
good faith purely subjective, requiring only that a party honestly be-
lieve that he is acting properly, and to what extent is good faith objec-
tive, requiring that a party in addition act in a reasonable manner?"
So he raises these as questions, but never answered them.
So to comment on Peter's point or the title to your paper of theory,
I don't read Allan's works as anti-theoretical at all, but I think of them
as non-theoretical. His non-theoretical views, the precise descriptions
of doctrines, supply those who are pro-theoretical with specific and 15
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helpful invitations to doubt and question. And at the exact places that
Allan left as a remark or a description, subjective or objective? Good
faith? Yes or no? And now, I am one of the pro-theoretical nuts, and
I could not write like Allan for many reasons. Some of them, you can
hear.
But the one that is relevant today is that I would not be able to
resist the need to question and doubt doctrine, to ask the "why" and
"how" questions that you were talking about. The importance of such
a critical look at doctrine, which goes beyond the accurate description,
is grounded in the doctrine, in the way doctrine is shaped and survives
through the years. Doctrine tends to reflect the solutions that make
sense for those who crafted doctrine. And what I want to emphasize
today is that doctrine seldom reflects the point of view of the
marginalized groups, especially when he chooses to adopt an objective
perspective. I use this mark, an objective or reasonable standard.
This does not have to be the result, the result of bad faith or conspir-
acy, because it's very difficult. It's difficult for a judge, a law profes-
sor, or a legislator to enjoy the status quo, the situation that is offered
by the doctrine and at the same time, to think that the same norm
might really turn as harmful to others.
The best example I know was made years ago by Peter, who
pointed to the color of the band-aid that we are using usually, which
people accept as a natural band-aid without thinking about how it
would look on a darker skin.72 So my argument here is that we can't
all be Allan. Some of us need to look at doctrine with a doubting
look. However, I am not sure this doubting look is theoretical in the
sense that Randy Barnett is going to talk about, and it was mentioned
by Peter as something that he wants to find in Allan's work. As Peter
mentioned, Randy's comment was-about a book of Allan's-was
that as good as it is, the book is not without its weaknesses. Doctrines
reflect on results, tensions, and conflicts among underlying theories of
contractual obligation and liability. The book does little to resolve the
dispute.
To my mind, there is no one grand theory on contract law, and we
should not be looking for one unless we really want to miss a lot. I
believe that at least one-at least some of us should be in a constant
mood of questioning. Who is served by a specific norm or theory and
who is going to pay the price for it? This is a mood that does not seek
to produce a grand theory at the end of the day and is not going to
resolve the result, theoretical tensions, as Randy Barnett expected Al-
lan to do. What such a critical mood can offer is quite modest, I think.
It's very far from one theory that can explain our multi-layered con-
tract law. It can offer better attention to flaws, flaws of the doctrine,
72. Patricia A. Tidwell & Peter Linzer, The Flesh-Colored Bandaid-Contracts,
Feminism, Dialogue and Norms, 28 Hous. L. REV. 791 (1991). 16
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and little improvements of some of the flaws. I have no doubt that
working in such a mood can help members of modern groups who will
get a legal solution that better fits their needs, but I also think that it
can improve the doctrine itself, making better doctrine, more inclusive
and more sophisticated.
I will give one example from my research in how we have the parol
evidence rule with us.7 3 We have had it now for 400 years. The lead-
ing text was written by Sir Edward Coke. 4 Amazingly, this ancient
text has been quoted repeatedly through the centuries as constituting
the modern parol evidence rule. Exploring the old text and its con-
tents can teach us a lot about the nature of this piece of doctrine, so I
will quote the text that was written 400 years ago. "It would be incon-
venient," said Sir Edward Coke, "that matters in writing made by ad-
vice and on consideration, and which finally import the certain truth
of the agreement of the parties, should be controlled by averment of
the parties to be proved by the uncertain testimony of slippery
memory. 7
5
Several characteristics of this code are evident from the wording;
just from the code that I read, everything. The rule aspires to separate
what is written from what is not written. It aspires to separation as an
ideal. It has a hierarchy in it, a nature of hierarchy where the written
is above what is unwritten, above the context. The text controls. It
has alleged rationality. It prefers being or appearing as rational to
being irrational. And it has a strong claim to certainty and very strong
pro-market orientation. I skipped this part of the quotation. Well, the
quotation goes on and says, "[I]t would be dangerous to purchasers
and farmers, and all others in such cases, if such nude averments
against matter in writing should be admitted. 7
6
So all of the characteristics that I have mentioned-the hierarchy,
separation, the preference for rationality or imagined rationality, and
the claim for certainty-are quite consistent with masculine stereo-
types, and they are not as associated with femininity or feminine ste-
reotypes. And again, it's stereotypes, but it's important.
The one example I want to give is the point of certainty. One rea-
son why scholars consider adhering to the written text as rational or
convenient, to use Sir Edward Coke's words, is because writing entails
or even promotes certainty to their mind. According to the text I just
quoted, the written document of the contract carries a certain truth.
That's the wording, while the averments consist of uncertain testi-
mony. Positioning certain truth against uncertain testimony, uncertain
73. See Hila Keren, Textual Harassment: A New Historicist Reappraisal of the Pa-
rol Evidence Rule with Gender in Mind, 13 AM. U. J. GENDER Soc. POL'Y & L. 251
(2005).
74. The Countess of Rutland's Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 89 (K.B. 1604).
75. Id. at 90.
76. Id.
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testimony not only suggests a preference for what is written, the hier-
archy point, but can be seen as a representation of the sincere nature
of certainty, as well as a barrier against the deceitful nature of uncer-
tainty. The question will be-if you are willing to question, if you are
not looking only at doctrine-the question would be, then, is it truly
the case? Assuming that certainty is achievable, which I doubt, is it
necessarily better? Is it in fact truthful, has the truth in it?
From some perspective as well as from a post-modern viewpoint,
the answer seems quite negative. To assume that certainty is so desir-
able means to believe that we should struggle to maintain the status
quo. But who is most interested in maintaining the status quo? If not
the powerful, who are best served by it and feel comfortable with it?
For the weaker members of a given society, those who yearn for
change, it is the status quo that prevents hopes for such members.
Their inferior situation is certain, and they dream of the uncertain
transformation to happen. So certainty, in other words, is valuable for
some, but not for all. It is valuable not necessarily because it is truth-
ful, but because of the service it provides for some people and the
obstacles to others.
As a representation of concrete evidence, certainty is not the truth,
but rather a partial version of the truth, namely the part that was well
documented in legal written terms. From the standpoint of those with
no access or legal access to written texts, there is nothing attractive
about the certainty that others gain from adopting the written text.
The tone that praises certainty is masculine. It holds no acknowledg-
ment of doubt, and it does not reflect what the English put here, nega-
tive capability, which I don't think that Allan put at the front of his
working. Negative capability, according to Keats, is the capacity to
remain, to stay in uncertainty, mistake, and doubt. Just to finish with
this point, it seems essential to view with suspicion.
I will expect this idea and say to view doctrine with suspicion as
maybe the possible reflection of habromanic motive in portraying
something as universally beneficial when it actually benefits only a
few.
(Applause)
BARNETT: Frank, I want to thank you for organizing this. It's
wonderful that we're getting this thing off the ground. I look forward
to participating in it regularly. It's great to be here.
Before I make the two points that I intend to make, I can't resist by
making some comments, some more personal comments about Allan
Farnsworth, who was enormously gracious and generous towards me
when I was very young. Reading Peter's paper reminded me of this
incident in the Dallas AALS Contracts Conference in '86 or '87. Al-
lan's paper was published in '87, so I am not sure whether the confer-
ence was in '86 or '87, but I was there. I believe I was in my third or
fourth year of teaching at the time. And you can imagine how I fell8
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when I was listening to the luncheon speaker. I actually remember
being in the room. I don't remember anything else about the confer-
ence, but I remember being in the room listening to Allan Farnsworth,
seeing him for the first time giving his luncheon talk. And he gets to
the end of the luncheon talk, and he gives these quotations from Mel
Eisenberg and from me, and I was just stunned, I was just floored.
Afterwards everybody came up to me, started shaking my hand, con-
gratulating me. "You made it." I just was astonished. And he was
always very kind towards me. I will miss him, and we'll all miss him.
It turned out to be a good career move on my part that my first
major contract piece was a Harvard Law Review book review of Al-
lan's work,77 and my first major substantive piece was published in the
Columbia Law Review,78 where Allan taught. I guess I got Allan's
attention that way, and then he reciprocated by mentioning me.
Anyway, I just came here to make two basic points. The first point
has to do with the distinction between descriptive and normative the-
ory, and the second has to do with the difference between contract law
theory and Constitutional theory, something that I have been wres-
tling with in recent years.
Let me make the first point first. In hindsight, I think it's wrong to
say that Allan Farnsworth was not a theorist. He was a theorist, but
he was a descriptive theorist, which I think fits Peter's concluding re-
marks about classifications and biology and that sort of thing. I think
that's what Allan did. He became such a towering figure, because he
was such an unbelievably insightful descriptive theorist, which means
he took the blooming, buzzing confusion of reality or of many, many
cases and many, many doctrines, and he systematized them.
That was part of his task in doing the Restatement, but also as a
treatise writer. He systematized them so well and so clearly and so
transparently, so accurately, that we all better understood this confus-
ing world. The reason why many of us recommend Allan's treatise to
our students is because it's so clear. And so it's clearly theoretical in
the sense that it makes such wonderful generalizations. So it's wrong
to say that Allan Farnsworth was not a theorist. But he was a descrip-
tive theorist. He was not a normative theorist. He was doing the best
he could, and he did very well to describe what is as opposed to why it
is and whether it should be changed. I think that there was a genera-
tional shift that happened after Allan attained his prominence, which
was one of the main points of my book review of his treatise in '84.
This generational shift was provoked by both the law-and-econom-
ics movement and critical-legal-studies movement in the 1970s. The
dominance of the descriptive approach to legal scholarship, as it ex-
isted up until that time, was challenged forcefully by these two differ-
77. Contract Scholarship, supra note 40.
78. Consent Theory, supra note 46.
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ent approaches, both of which had their roots in different aspects of
legal realism. I think the word that the left used to describe this domi-
nance was the "privileging of the status quo." The problem with being
a purely descriptive theorist is that it privileges what it is you are
describing, which is the status quo. That's what a descriptive theorist
is purporting to describe. Therefore, a purely descriptive approach
takes for granted-literally "for granted"-what is and doesn't ques-
tion that. And this approach implies that what is, is also what ought to
be.
What was missing in contract scholarship-in fact, in all legal schol-
arship-was a sophisticated normative approach. With the challenge
posed first by law and economics, and then perhaps even to a greater
extent by critical legal studies, everything got going. Everybody woke
up and started debating these things. Of course, you also had "lib-
eral" scholars, in which category I put myself as a classical liberal,
responding to the critiques coming from law and economics and criti-
cal legal studies, but operating at the same level of normative dis-
course as law and economics and critical legal studies, but making a
different normative case.
So while I do now believe that Allan was a theorist, he was a de-
scriptive theorist, and that type of legal theory came to be challenged,
not because it was unhelpful-I'm going to get to why it was helpful in
just a moment-but because it was limited. I think Peter is right to say
that Allan recognized his limits. I don't know whether he was some-
what resentful of the shift in attention towards more normative theory
or not, but he certainly understood it. I suppose because it wasn't
something he was interested in, he didn't practice it himself. And Al-
lan's books that Peter references don't offer any contributions to that
discourse.
Now, I think it helps us to understand the nature of normative con-
tracts scholarship to compare contract law theory with constitutional
theory. As some of you know, I have been doing a lot of constitu-
tional theory in recent years. This has given me an opportunity to
think about the difference between doing contract law theory and
constitutional theory. This difference is rather significant and some-
thing that we as contracts professors should be aware of, and it con-
cerns what it is we are theorizing about.
The subject of contract law theory is largely, for better or for worse,
contract doctrine or the rules and principles of contract law. What
makes contract law so wonderful, what makes it such a marvelous
course to be taught, and also so challenging to both law students and
theorists is that we in contracts have lots of doctrine, and it's hard to
get a handle on it all. It's hard to remember it all, it's hard to under-
stand it all, and it's certainly hard to rationalize and put it all together
even descriptively, which is, again, why we owe a debt to Allan Farns-
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worth for having helped us in that. But, to repeat, the subject of our
theorizing in contract law is the doctrine.
Now, it's true that if we are normatively theorizing, we need to be
questioning some of this doctrine, arguing it's wrong. But we are dis-
cussing the doctrine, and we are accepting it as the focus of our nor-
mative inquiry, while rejecting it, rationalizing it, whatever. That's not
true in constitutional theory. By the way, did you notice a subtle, rhe-
torical shift? We speak of contract law theory because the subject of
the theory is contract law. In constitution theory, we don't speak of
constitutional law theory. Nobody talks about that. They call it con-
stitutional theory. Why? Because the subject of constitutional theory
is either the Constitution or "constitutionalism," but it is not constitu-
tional law. No normative Constitutional theorist spends a whole lot of
time talking about constitutional law, by which I mean constitutional
law doctrine.
And for those of you who do not teach constitutional law, the doc-
trine of constitutional law doesn't look anything like the doctrine in
contract law. The doctrine in constitutional law-and I have to keep
this somewhat clean because it's being transcribed, and I assume it's
going to be published sometime. But let's just say that Constitutional
law doctrine can be vacuous. I am trying to think of nice euphemisms
for what I really want to say. And it's ephemeral. That is, it comes, it
goes, it's up and down. And it also doesn't dictate results, as the criti-
cal legal studies or the indeterminacy theorists said about all of law.
Their critique that the doctrine doesn't dictate results is largely true
about constitutional law. On this, I can speak from personal experi-
ence from having litigated a case to the Supreme Court last year in
which we had the law on our side, but that only got us three votes,
which was two more votes than anybody thought we were going to
get.
I am referring to the medical cannabis case,79 for those of you who
don't know. By getting three votes, we definitely beat the spread.
But we had "the law" on our side. We also, by the way, had sympa-
thetic Plaintiffs, and we had sympathetic public policy on our side. So
those of you who are legal realists in the room, I defy you to explain
why nobody gave us a chance of winning with the law, sympathy, and
policy on our side.
But that just makes my point. You can't rely on the law when you
are doing constitutional law, whether engaged in constitutional prac-
tice or constitutional theory. And Constitutional law theorists don't
make constitutional law doctrine the subject of their inquiry contract.
Why not? The answer, I believe, involves the source of the doctrines
in these two subjects.
79. Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005).
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The source of contract law doctrine is the spontaneous evolution of
centuries of exposure to individual contract disputes. The contract
law doctrine that we have inherited is the repository of the wisdom of
centuries of development, of people developing contract law doctrine
in the context of deciding between individual contesting parties who
are both asserting claims of right. I am not claiming that, simply be-
cause it has been inherited, existing contract law doctrine is necessa-
rily wisdom. Rather, given the process in which it evolved, there is
reason to think that contract law doctrine contains a genuine starting
point of wisdom from which we then deviate. So that's why contract
law doctrine is the subject of our normative inquiry and why it is
worth studying.
Constitutional law doctrine, however, doesn't come from the same
place. It comes from a collective body of nine Justices trying to make
law by a committee whose membership is constantly changing. And
this ever changing committee is comprised of persons who have differ-
ent political commitments, who want to come to different results, and
who share different political philosophies.
Of course, under its rules, these Justices have to justify what they
do. Sometimes they do so in the name of doctrine that they adhere to
on Sunday and disregard on Wednesday. Because the source of con-
stitutional law doctrine just isn't the same as contract law doctrine, I
believe that is why intuitively it's not considered to be a repository of
wisdom, to anywhere near the same degree. That's why it's not the
subject of our studies. What we study is the Constitution, which I do,
by the way, think is a repository of wisdom based upon how it came
about, who wrote it, and how it has been altered by amendments that
corrected some of its original defects. We also study the Constitution
because of our underlying normative political theory that justifies hav-
ing a written Constitution at all.
With all this in mind, here is why I think Allan Farnsworth's work is
so valuable, and why normative contract scholars cannot do without it:
Allan's descriptive theories of what contract law doctrine truly is pro-
vides the grist for the mills of normative contract law theorists. This
was Hila's point. Allan provided us with tremendously accessible and
refined data about the subject of our theorizing, contract law, from
which we can begin our analysis and then proceed from there. Do we
like it? We don't like it. Can we explain it? Can we rationalize it or
justify it or not?
So Allan's scholarship, and that of all contract doctrinalists who are
descriptive theorists as he was, is of enormous value to those of us
who are more normative. Being a contract scholar who is more doc-
trinally oriented, provided you are as descriptive and theoretical as
Allan Farnsworth was, provides as essential a service to the develop-
ment of contract law theory as the more normative theorists, given
that the latter group must rely to a large extent on the output of thQ2
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former who are identifying that body of contract law we then justify or
critique.
The last thing I would just say concerns a form of rhetoric we
should dispense with, and that is this notion of a grand theory. The
use of the term "grand theory" always signals somebody who doesn't
like normative theory. It's a not-so-hidden pejorative. It sounds
overly ambitious. It sounds egotistical. We are all against grand theo-
ries because nobody is smart enough to have a grand theory. I think
the better word is "a theory." It doesn't have to be grand; it just has
to be a theory. That's all.
Characterizing oneself as anti-grand theory rhetorically suggests
you are for theory, but you are just against the grand kind. To the
extent that those who condemn "grand theory" are really opposed to
genuine coherent theories, however, this is not nearly so intuitively
appealing position to have as an academic. But those of us who de-
velop theories really don't purport to have a grand theory. I never
purported to have a grand theory, but I did try to have a theory. I
hold my theory up against the others, and we will see which survives
intellectual discourse.
At any rate, I thank you all and look forward to the next two days
getting to know you-especially putting a face to the names of those
of you I have seen online on the contract law lists-and having a great
time listening to you on your panels. Thanks.
(Applause)
JOSEPH PERILLO: Thank you, Frank, for having me here. Peggy
Kniffin, who teaches at St. John's, called me yesterday morning and
mentioned that she had heard Allan, at some conference or other in
the '70s, probably the '80s, say that economic theories of law, philo-
sophical theories of law are fads. A fad is something that disappears.
Unfortunately, these are not disappearing. Don't take me for a know-
nothing. Economists should study law and write about it in the De-
partment of Economics. Philosophers should study law and write
about it in the Philosophy Club. But lawyers who teach law students
should be teaching law. The grand theory-and let's think of the the-
ory of evolution. What is that? It's a grand theory that describes an
aspect of reality. That's what Allan Farnsworth and some others of us
try to do.
Now, Randy Barnett-I am going to pick a quarrel with him, I told
him a little earlier I would-wrote a book review in 1999 about Hill-
man's book on the richness of contract law.8" I think that may not be
the exact title. And in that book review, Randy says, "Well, there is a
generational gap. These guys were born in 1933, like me and Bob
80. Richness of Contract Theory, supra note 25 (reviewing ROBERT HILLMAN, THE
RICHNESS OF CONTRACT LAW: AN ANALYSIS AND CRITIQUE OF CONTEMPORARY
THEORIES OF CONTRACT LAW (1997)).
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Summers, were taught in a different way than-and think in a differ-
ent way than the younger folk do."81 And he uses the Bob Summers/
Steve Burton debate about the definition of "good faith" as an illus-
tration. Burton supposedly giving a theory, and Summers giving a list
of factors. The Burton theory essentially is a quotation, actually, from
the New York Court of Appeals that if you try to-if a person who is a
contracting party attempts to deprive the other of the fruits of the
contract, that's bad faith.82 And Summers says, "No, it's more compli-
cated than that. 83
Earlier this week, I got a series of written questions by the parties to
a lawsuit in England, in my role as an expert witness on New York
law. And one of the questions ran something like this: Assuming a
seller is lied to by the buyer post-contract in order to stall, to try to
raise funds, how would New York law regard that? And it struck me,
well, post-contract lies that are material affect performance? That's
dishonesty. That's bad faith. It's not bad faith in Burton's generaliza-
tion. It is in the list of factors that Summers says, which is not com-
plete, so I would add, you know, lying in a material way after
contracting. So, Randy treats Burton's description as theoretical and
Summers's as not. To me, they are both descriptive, and Summers has
a better description. I now yield to David Campbell, who will now
speak to you.
(Applause)
DAVID CAMPBELL: The substance of my comments has, as I
feared might occur, been anticipated by Randy Barnett, but I shall
make those comments anyway. I will try to give them some novelty
by making reference to the situation in England and Wales.
I am very grateful to Peter Linzer for all that I have learned about
Farnsworth by reading his paper, but I found it difficult to accept that
Farnsworth wasn't in some useful sense a theorist. Somebody who
was able to take very difficult material and explain it, setting out its
principles in an extraordinarily lucid way, seems to me to have a good
claim to the title of theorist, and I would like to try to flesh out my
case for regarding Farnsworth as a theorist in a way that gives some
guidance to our current practice as contract scholars.
81. See id. at 1413-17.
82. See Steven J. Burton, Breach of Contract and the Common Law Duty to Per-
form in Good Faith, 94 HARV. L. REV. 369, 379-80 (1980) (quoting Kirke La Shelle
Co. v. Paul Armstrong Co., 188 N.E. 163, 167 (1933) ("[I]n every contract there is an
implied covenant that neither party shall do anything which will have the effect of
destroying or injuring the right of the other party to receive the fruits of the contract,
which means that in every contract there exists an implied covenant of good faith and
fair dealing.")).
83. See Robert S. Summers, The General Duty of Good Faith-Its Recognition and
Conceptualization, 67 CORNELL L. REV. 810 (1982). Burton responded further to
Summers in Steven J. Burton, More on Good Faith Performance of a Contract: A
Reply to Professor Summers, 69 IOWA L. REV. 497 (1984). 24
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It wasn't only accepting that Farnsworth wasn't a theorist that I
found difficult, but also accepting the accuracy of Peter's claim to
draw authority from Llewellyn for not taking up theoretical positions.
I found this particularly hard to accept as Llewellyn, with Fuller, is
one of the two legal theorists I most admire. I think what is going on
here is, as Randy says, some confusion between the notion of what I
will follow Randy and call "grand theory," and theory as such. What
we tend to do, I think even now, is associate not merely grand theory
with Langdell, but the very idea of producing theorizations about con-
tract, by which I mean general statements of the principles of contract
law, with Langdell.
We are all far too sophisticated now to accept the claims of
Langdellian formalism. But the way in which we reject these claims
sometimes doesn't serve the interests of those of us who are critical of
formalism very well. We seem to some extent accept the idea that, if
formalism was possible, it would be very good. But, we go on to ob-
serve, contract law, or indeed law, and perhaps life itself, unfortu-
nately is just not of a form to make formalism achievable, and so we
concede we have to accept a sort of second-best formalism as the fur-
thest we can take things.
There undoubtedly is an enormous amount of wisdom in this
stance, but I don't think this wisdom is expressed very clearly, and I
think it important to express that wisdom more clearly. For, at the
moment, formalism is by no means a dead letter in the contract law of
England and Wales. Rather, it has had a great many extremely influ-
ential proponents in the last 25 years, and formalism of a decidedly
aggressive type is having a very powerful influence especially on ap-
peal court hearings of contract cases, and the law, particularly of rem-
edies for breach, is facing very substantial change as a result. That law
is being changed by the application of abstract principles to cases by
appeal courts which are showing little appreciation of the practical
effect of what they are doing, and we are experiencing a sort of a
revenge of formalism in the current effective revision of the law of
remedies for breach of contract along lines prescribed by abstract
principle.
This is all being driven by the lure of the promise of a formalism
that can actually provide a workable general classification of the law
of remedies for breach, and, indeed, of the general law of private obli-
gations. Undoubtedly the most gifted proponent of this position, the
late Professor Peter Birks, tended to describe central features of the
law of remedies which he didn't like in persuasively pejorative terms,
essentially as lacking conceptual coherence and rigor, and put forward
as improvements alternatives, certainly derived with an initially most
impressive show of coherence and rigor, from the structure of his gen-
eral classification of obligations. This very aggressive, and, for the mo-
ment, still successful, formalist style in England and Wales has gained
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considerable support from the U.K.'s membership of the European
Union. There now is being identified a large body of general contrac-
tual and specialized commercial principles which it is claimed is de-
rived from the national laws of the civilian E.U. countries and from
the specific law of the E.U., with which the law of England and Wales
is being urged to harmonize. (I should also mention the so-called
"horizontal effect" of the European Convention on Human Rights,
which is not constrained by a concept of state action, and so its princi-
ples have the potential to directly intervene in private commercial re-
lationships, but I shall not dwell on this.)
One can detect the influence of Allan Farnsworth upon the very
active steps being taken to promote a harmonized European contract
law, particularly upon what's called the "common frame of reference"
for the development of that law. The principles of this frame of refer-
ence are markedly influenced by the U.N. Convention on the Interna-
tional Sale of Goods84 and the UNIDROIT principles." Via these
fruits of his labors, Farnsworth is having an important, if distanced,
effect on the emerging E.U. law, and therefore on the law of England
and Wales.
But I do not think Farnsworth would entirely approve of what is
being done. For what is very striking about the harmonization effort,
and about the current adoption in England and Wales of appeal court
reasoning based on, as it were, abstract principle, rather than on the
precedent-based common law style, is that we are getting argument
from general, abstract, principles, or, to put it in the way it is being
discussed here, argument that is clearly influenced by the lure of the
grand style. And this is not in keeping with what I find so interesting
in Farnsworth and, of course, in Llewellyn, which is how to proceed in
a principled manner after one rejects formalist ambition. The rejec-
tion of what I am following Randy and calling the grand style is not a
mainly theoretical point. It is, as Randy told us, expressive of a partic-
ular economic and political stance. The law of contract is meant to
reflect the intentions of parties who do not have an overall, grand per-
spective. That is the nature of the market economy. The market is
unplanned and proceeds on the basis of spontaneity without an over-
all perspective being possessed by the parties to the contracts.
As our law of contract is meant to reflect the intentions of these
parties, it is inevitable that that law must be based on a rejection of
the grand style of argument from general principle, because this is de-
manded by respect for the nature of the action of the parties to con-
84. The United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of
Goods, supra note 16.
85. Int'l Inst. for the Unification of Private Law, UNIDROIT Principles of Inter-
national Commercial Contracts, reprinted in G. GREGORY LETTERMAN,
UNIDROIT's RULES IN PRACTICE: STANDARD INTERNATIONAL CONTRACTS AND
APPLICABLE RULES (2001). 26
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tracts. With respect to Randy, I think it's wrong to distinguish so
strongly between the normative and descriptive attitudes, because the
descriptive attitude is a very strongly normative stance. But the nor-
mative implication of the descriptive attitude is that you will accept
the intentions of the parties, so that a statement of contract principles
will seek merely to describe the law produced by attempts to give ef-
fect to those intentions. One can call this endorsing the status quo,
and obviously there are profound criticisms that can and should be
made about the social, economic and, political framework in which
the intentions of the parties are formed. The relational law of contract
has gone furthest in showing just how necessary and far reaching this
criticism should be. But the law of contract is, in a sense, fundamen-
tally based on positive respect for the status quo, because we are try-
ing to give effect to the intentions of the parties, formed, of course,
within the existing social structure.
If all this is the case, and if one finds anything positive in the con-
tractual stance, I think what we should try to do is make explicit the
type of theory that informs Farnsworth's practice as a contract scholar,
and explicitly do what his practice implicitly articulates. He is articu-
lating the rejection of grand theory, and we should make this rejection
explicit and celebrate it. It has its political corollary in our overall
positive attitude towards the market sphere and our acceptance of the
intentions of the parties within that sphere, and its legal corollary in
our rejection of grand arguments from abstract principle, and of for-
malism as an at-all-plausible goal, expressed in our commitment to the
common law attitude.
In essence, I think the right attitude to take is to stress the theoreti-
cal importance of Farnsworth's descriptive scholarship as the illustra-
tion in contract of Llewellyn's views on reckonability. To attempt to
go beyond this proper standard for reasoning in contract law is simply
a mistake. If I can try to imitate Peter's learning by making reference
to a great figure of the physical sciences, I would like to finish with a
paraphrase of Einstein. What I think Farnsworth positively tells us is
that our contractual theories should be as coherent as possible, but it's
very important that they are not more coherent than is possible.
(Applause)
GARVIN: Just a couple of minutes. If I might take a slight moder-
ator's prerogative, a quick comment and then plea for assistance. The
comment is when Allan Farnsworth asked me to join him on his trea-
tise,86 he sent me a set of suggestions. And one of the things he said
when choosing which articles to refer to in the treatise was this-and
I'm paraphrasing it, I regret. Paraphrasing Allan Farnsworth is dan-
gerous. But he said something like he seldom found citation to eco-
nomic or critical articles fruitful. He said, however, the same thing
86. CONTRACrS, supra note 14.
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about purely descriptive articles-that they, too, should be left out.
So I mention that, and it's curious also because Pat Farnsworth told
me he originally wanted to be an economist and had applied to grad
school in economics but his father, the mathematician, said, "You
might want to give law school a try," and so he did. And it seems to
have stuck reasonably well. But the plea for assistance that I want to
make is the fairly obvious one. We have a range of views about the
proper role of theory, however denominated. So what am I supposed
to do? You are all familiar with his treatise and Hornbook. And so
what are my instructions?
BARNETT: Did you want to follow the original intention of the
framer? Is that it?
PERILLO: Hold a s6ance?
GARVIN: There is something slightly more serious, more serious.
When the volumes fly off of the presses in 2010, I think that's an es-
tablished date, what should be the role of theory, however denomi-
nated, in a treatise that served so many audiences, which we must
remember, the students, the practitioner, the likes of us? I wonder-
does anybody have any "assistance"?
BARNETT: I am just going to grab the time here so I can respond
to Joe. I will say that I think the treatise is fine the way it is, notwith-
standing my little criticism of it in my review of it.87 I am going to be
writing a shorter book for Oxford University Press in their new per-
spectives series. I will be doing the contracts volume.
I am going to use contract theory in mine, but of course I'm going to
attempt to be descriptively accurate about contract law doctrine.
Therefore, I will be relying on authorities that provide accurate de-
scriptions. Perhaps when Allan said that descriptive articles weren't
helpful, he was referring to more pedestrian doctrinal works. There
was nothing at all pedestrian about the descriptive theorizing he did,
which was not merely descriptive, but was theorizing or generalizing
from the law as it is. That is the theoretical exercise in which I now
believe he was engaged. And I cannot believe he would think that
comparable efforts to generalize from the particulars in the way he did
would not be helpful to treatise writing.
I want to respond to Joe's comment a little bit. First of all, I am
glad that you criticized Burton's theory and not mine, so I don't have
to be vested in defending it. But if it's true that Burton's theory
doesn't accurately describe things that are called "good faith," then I
think that's something wrong with the theory. That's a theoretical
problem. You have Summers's theory and Burton's theory, and the
Summers theory is better. That's a theoretical dispute.
PERILLO: If I could just answer that.
BARNETT: Okay. But I do have a point to make.
87. Contract Scholarship, supra note 40. 28
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PERILLO: The first book of theory that I read was Fried's book on
contract as promise.88 I was repelled. He took aspects of contract law
that did not fit his theory, like duress, in a footnote where he would
cite the proper articles but would not recognize the content of those
articles. He shoved everything aside that didn't fit into his theory.
And this is the problem with most theorists. I spoke to one theorist I
admire greatly, Ian Macneil, many years ago. I said, "Ian, you have
come up with a grand theory. Why don't you bring it down to earth so
that we know the concrete application?" He said, "I am waiting for
somebody to do that."
BARNETT: We have all asked Ian that. Everyone who knows Ian
has asked him that. If you could risk it. At any rate, I understand that
would be bad. That a theorist fails to provide any clue as to applica-
tions is a legitimate substantive criticism. The only other point I was
going to make-and we're running so short of time-is that Burton's
theory, or any other, is not a substitute for doctrine. To some degree,
it is an explanation or rationalization of the doctrine. And he has a
normative part of his article which says what the doctrine ought to be.
But his theory itself is no substitute for doctrine.
I learned this lesson my first year of contracts teaching when I em-
phasized theory-abstract theory, normative theory-in my first year
of teaching, and then I had to grade the blue books. In their exams,
my students tried desperately to apply the theory to the facts of a
hypothetical. Their answers were awful, and I could immediately see
it wasn't their fault. It was the fault of their professor. From then on I
taught doctrine as well as theory. I emphasized doctrine. I was teach-
ing doctrine all along, but because I was emphasizing theory, they
thought that's what I wanted to hear on the exam. It taught me a
lesson: you can't apply theory directly to the facts without intermedi-
ary doctrine. That's why having descriptively accurate renditions of
the doctrine is so important.
However, when I was asked to testify as an expert witness in the
Shawn Kemp Reebok contract dispute89 on the issue of whether he
had materially breached his endorsement contract, I did have to famil-
iarize myself with the recor. When I did, I was able to apply Eric
Anderson's very Burtonian theory of material breach90 to reach a rel-
atively immediate and clear judgment that Reebok had indeed materi-
ally breached the contract by unilaterally terminating its agreement
with Kemp because Kemp had not himself materially breached. An-
88. CHARLES FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE: A THEORY OF CONTRACTUAL OB-
LIGATION (1981).
89. Shawn Kemp was an NBA player who was alleged to have breached a Reebok
endorsement contract in 2000 when he reportedly claimed that Nikes were his favor-
ite shoes. See, e.g., Just d'oh It, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, Oct. 27, 2005.
90. Eric G. Anderson, A New Look at Material Breach in the Law of Contracts, 21
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1073 (1988).
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derson's theory of material breach was extremely useful to me even
before I looked at the doctrine or the cases. In fact, my litigation ad-
vice to the lawyers, who didn't follow it, was to go out and consult
with Eric Anderson about this question so, if I relied on his theory
when I testified, Reebok could not call Eric as its expert. So please go
out and consult with him, which will conflict him out of being called
by Reebok. They didn't do that, which reflects on their thoroughness
as litigators and helps explain why Shawn Kemp ended up having to
pay Reebok to settle the case.
GARVIN: Well, thank you very much.
